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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
CCD, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company, d/b/a/ UNITED TITLE
SERVICES OF SOUTHERN UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
CaseNo.20020875-SC

v.
CHRISTOPHER LYNN MILLSAP, an
individual,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)
(1953, as amended), whereby this Court has appellate jurisdiction over orders,
judgments, and decrees of any court of record in which the Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction. This case proceeds from a grant of summary
judgment in a civil case by the district court, and falls within this category. See e.g,
Guardian Title Co. v. Mitchell, 54 P.3d 130, 132 (Utah 2002) (noting jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0)).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue #1:

Did the district court err in denying Millsap's motion for summary

judgment and expelling Millsap pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710, where Millsap
had already retired and was no longer a "member" as contemplated by the statute?

Preservation: The issue regarding the statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §
48-2c-710 was preserved for review and set forth in Millsap's "Memorandum in Support
of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," R. 201-207; Millsap's "Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply to Plaintiffs
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," R. 474- 491; and during oral
argument at the summary judgment motion hearing. See Transcript of Motion for
Summary Judgment, dated June 6, 2002, ("Tr.") at 5, 12-15.
Issue #2:

Did the district court err in denying Millsap's motion for summary

judgment and expelling Millsap where CCD, through its Members, waived its rights to
expel and/or refuse performance of the Operating Agreement and Amendment?
Preservation: The issue of CCD's waivers was preserved and set forth in Millsap's
"Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," R. 474491; and during oral argument at the summary judgment motion hearing. See Tr. at 1722.
Issue #3:

Did the district court err in denying Millsap's motion for summary

judgment and expelling Millsap where Millsap clearly met the three conditions precedent
to regaining his rights under the Operating Agreement, including his right to retire, and
where Millsap did not "materially breach" the Amendment to the Operating Agreement?
Preservation: The issue concerning Millsap's alleged "material breach" of the
Amendment to the Operating Agreement was preserved for review during oral argument
at the summary judgment motion hearing, see Tr. at 20-21; and set forth in Millsap's
2

"Objections to Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, Motion for
Reconsideration, and Memorandum in Support," R. 522-533; and "Defendant's Reply to
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Objections to Proposed Findings
of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Motion for Reconsideration," R. 579-581.
Standards of Review:
In reviewing grants of summary judgment, this Court determines "whether the
trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held
that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50
(Utah 1996). See also, Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, f 12. Whether the trial court properly
granted summary judgment is a question of law that this Court reviews for correctness,
according no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See e.g., Holmes Dev., LLC
v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, K 21; Hill, 2001 UT 16, f 12. In making that determination, this
Court views "'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ]fl5 (quoting DCMInv.
Corp. v. Pinecrest Inv. Co., 2001 UT 91, \ 6).
Further, a trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness,
without deference to the trial court's conclusions. See e.g., Stephens v. Bonneville Travel,
Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997); Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah
1990).
Relatedly, a "contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, determined
by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of

3

intent." Fairbourne Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing, 68 P.3d 1038, 1040 (Utah
App. 2003). As such, an "unambiguous contract may be interpreted by the appellate court
as a matter of law." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, U 35. See also,
Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d 440, 442 (Utah 2002) ("If the language within the four
comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a
matter of law") (citations omitted).
Finally, this Court reviewsfindingsof facts and conclusions of law prepared by a
prevailing party with less deference. Although, the "discretion of adopting the findings as
submitted to the trial court is exclusively in that court as long as the findings are not
clearly contrary to the evidence," Boyer Company v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Utah
1977), where, as is the case here, "it is alleged on appeal that the findings don't reflect the
judge's view," then this Court need not assume that the trial court found the prepared
findings satisfactory in all particulars. See State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Utah
App. 1993).
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS1
The following statutes, constitutional provisions and evidentiary rules are relevant
to this appeal and the issues presented:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-708;
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-709;
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710;
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

!

The referenced statutory provisions are attached as "Addendum A."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final judgment in which the district court denied Millsap's
Motion for Summary Judgment and instead granted summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiff CCD, resulting in the judicial expulsion of Mr. Millsap pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 48-2c-710. Final judgment was entered September 3, 2002. See R. 599. The
Notice of Appeal was timely entered September 16, 2002. See R. 601.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
CCD, LLC Is Formed
1.

During 1994, Craig Newman ("Newman"), Doug Stanley ("Stanley"), and

Christopher Millsap ("Millsap") came together to create a title company which would
operate in the St. George, Utah, area. See R. 244, If 2.
2.

On October 1, 1994, Newman, Stanley and Millsap, executed the "Articles

of Organization of CCD, L.L.C." thereby forming CCD pursuant to the Utah Limited
Liability Company Act. See R. 2, \l\ R. 202, | 1 ; R. 241, Tfl; R. 317-322.
3.

Acting at all times with the benefit of counsel, and after informed

consideration of various options, Newman, Stanley, and Millsap also entered into an
Operating Agreement on October 1, 1994, in connection with the formation of CCD for
the purpose of setting forth the individual rights, duties and ownership interests in the
corporation.2 See R. 2, f 9; R. 197,fflf2-4; R. 202, f 2; R. 241-42,1J2; R. 209-218.
4.

2

With regard to the relevant provisions of the Operating Agreement:

A copy of the Operating Agreement is attached as "Addendum B."
5

a.

Paragraph 12 of the Operating Agreement specifically provides for

and recognizes the right of a member to withdraw upon the happening of the event of
retirement. See R. 216. Paragraph 12 further provides that "The Company shall not
terminate by the retirement or death of a Member." See id. Instead, the Company, upon
retirement or death, may at its option, "purchase and retire all or part of the interest of the
retiring.. .Member.. .and continue the Company business under its present name." See
id. If the Company chooses not to do so, then the remaining Members may elect to
purchase such Company interest. See R. 217. If, however, neither the company nor the
members elect to purchase the company interest of the retiring Member, then the
Company shall be wound up and properties distributed. See R. 218.
b.

Paragraph 7(E)(vii) of the Operating Agreement provides that, "No

member, without the majority consent of the Members, shall. . .use the name, credit or
property of the Company for any purpose other than a proper Company purpose." R. 3, f
12; R. 213-214.
c.

Paragraph 7(E)(viii) provides that, "No member, without the

majority consent of the Members, shall do.. .any act detrimental to the Company
business or which would make it impossible to carry on the business." R. 3, f 12; R. 214.
d.

The Operating Agreement also provides for remedies of a violation

of the listed restrictions in subsection 7(E) and states that:
In the event any Member should violate the above listed
restrictions, said Member shall become liable to the Company
for the amount of the claim incurred by the Company in
connection with said violation of the restriction. The
6

Members of the Company shall have such other legal rights
and remedies for said violation as may exist under Utah law.
R. 214. See also R.3, % 14.
e.

Finally, Paragraph 13 of the Operating Agreement, provides that

"No Member may be expelled from the Company by act or desire of the remaining
Members."R.219.3
Millsap Admittedly Misuses Trust Account Funds
5.

CCD commenced operations as a title company in 1995, and in connection

therewith, opened a trust account with Zions First National Bank, N.A. See R. 2, ^ 8; R.3,
If 15; R. 243-244,1|l.
6.

During 1998 through 2000, Millsap wrongfully used money deposited in

the CCD trust account for his own personal purposes. See R. 66, f 1; R. 264; R. 273- 290;
R. 476, If 4.
7.

In March of 2000, Millsap admitted to his partners that he had wrongfully

diverted funds from the company trust account, and provided an accounting4 of his
defalcation. See R. 244, % 4.
8.

On March 4, 2000, Millsap and the other two members of CCD held a

3

Although this provision has been trumped by Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-120(f),
this contractual provision is nevertheless important in evidencing the intent of the parties
when entering into the Operating Agreement.
4

There is a materially disputed fact as to whether this "accounting" was an
"estimation" or "a fully accurate accounting" of misused funds relied upon by Newman
and Stanley. See R. 476, ^ 5. Such dispute served as the basis for the district court's
finding that there were materially disputed facts concerning CCD's claims of fraudulent
inducement.
7

special meeting to discuss repayment of funds. It was decided at this time that the
authorities would not be notified and that Stanley and Newman would give Millsap an
opportunity to repay the funds to the trust account. See R. 61-62; R. 246,17; R. 380-381;
R. 477,1| 7.
9.

At no time upon finding out about Millsap's misuse of trust account funds

did CCD, through its members, seek to expel Millsap or refuse to perform under the
terms of the Operating Agreement, but instead opted to enter into an Amendment to the
Operating Agreement on April 21, 2000.5 See R. 198,1f 11 5-9; R. 219-222; R. 477, If 1 78; R. 478, t H 9, 11, 12.
10.

In entering into the Amendment, as in the Operating Agreement, the

members received the advise of counsel. See R. 198, If 6.
Millsap Fulfills The Requirements
Of The Amendment To The Operating Agreement
11.

The Amendment to the Operating Agreement provided, in relevant part,

that:
a.

Newman agreed to lend Millsap $493,965 pursuant to

a promissory note. See R. 221,1f D. As security, Millsap granted Newman a security
interest in Millsap's interest in CCD. See R. 219, f A; R. 414-416 (Promissory Note).
b.

If Millsap defaulted on the Newman Loan, "any and all of

Millsap's rights to vote his membership interest in CCD shall be terminated and shall be

5

A copy of the Amendment to the Operating Agreement is attached as
"Addendum C."
8

immediately vested in Newman, who shall be entitled to exercise all such rights from and
after the date of the default." R. 219-220. Moreover, if Newman foreclosed this security
interest, "Newman would have two-thirds of the voting rights of CCD." R. 220,1f A.
c.

Some of Millsap's rights as a member were temporarily

suspended and modified-notably, Millsap's right to retire and the manner he would be
paid under paragraph 12(B) of the Operating Agreement for his interest in the company
upon retirement. See R. 220, ^ B.
d.

Under the Amendment, Millsap was removed as Manager of

CCD, and his main duties included, but were not limited to, generating business for CCD.
See R. 220, \ C.
e.

Importantly, the parties agreed that:

if no default has occurred under the Newman Loan,
the Newman Loan has been paid in full and within one
year after the Newman Loan has been paid in full the
Parties have not amended the Operating Agreement,
then the modifications contained in the amended agreement
in paragraphs B and C herein shall thereafter be of no
further force and effect and the terms of the Operating
Agreement shall thereafter be binding upon the Parties.
R. 221, t C (emphasis added).
f.

Accordingly, although the Amendment temporarily eliminated

Millsap's membership rights in CCD, it also provided that such rights would be
reinstated if Millsap repaid the loan, a year went by, and there were no further
amendments to the Operating Agreement. See id. See also, R.198, f 9.
12.

At no time did the two other members of CCD indicate they wanted to
9

rescind, terminate, or refuse performance of the Operating Agreement, or expel Millsap
from membership due to Millsap's alleged "first breach."
13.

In September of 2000, Millsap made the final payment due under the

Newman Loan as set out in the Amendment to the Operating Agreement. See R. 198, ^
10; R. 227,^10.
Millsap Reports His Defalcation To The Authorities
14.

On October 25, 2000, a meeting of the members of CCD was held. At this

time, Millsap was presented with the "option" of accepting a buy-out offer for his share
of CCD, or having his criminal defalcation reported to the authorities by his partners. See
R.491;R.488,n.l2.
15.

Millsap refused the buy-out offer and instead went to the Utah State

Insurance Commissioner and self-reported his defalcation. See Tr. 22-23.
16.

Based upon the information presented by Millsap, he was charged

criminally with unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary. See R. 273-290.
The Race To The Courthouse
17.

In September of 2001, all of the conditions precedent to Millsap's

reinstatement as a member of CCD had occurred. Specifically, Millsap had fully repaid
the Newman Loan, the one year waiting period had run, and there had been no further
amendments to the Operating Agreement. See R. 198, f 10; R. 227, f 10.
18.

On September 7, 2001, in anticipation of his retirement as a member of

CCD, Millsap sent correspondence to the company requesting an appraisal of his interest
in CCD, pursuant to f 14 of the Operating Agreement. Paragraph 14 of the Operating
10

Agreement is entitled "Valuation of the Interest Of a Deceased or Retired Member." See
R. 469-470.
19.

Almost immediately thereafter, on September 28, 2001, despite the clear

intentions of the members set forth in the Operating Agreement not to sue, CCD filed a
complaint against Millsap including a claim for Millsap's expulsion from the company.
See generally R. 1-24 (complaint); R. 214,ffi[18-19.
20.

On October 16, 2002, Millsap submitted his formal notice of retirement

from CCD. See R.198, f 11; R. 180.6 At this time, it had been almost two years since
Millsap was last physically present on the premises of the company. See R. 503 (noting
Millsap was terminated in October of 2000); R. 313 (noting that Millsap was terminated
October 13, 2000).
21.

On March 6, 2002, Millsap pleaded guilty to several counts and stipulated

to the payment of full restitution. See R. 263-271.
Facts Relevant To Summary Judgment Proceedings
And District Court Findings
22.

On February 6, 2002, the district court ordered that all of CCD's claims,

except for the expulsion claim, be submitted to binding arbitration. The district court
retained jurisdiction over the expulsion claim. See R. 196, 234-235.
23.

On March 6, 2002, Millsap moved for summary judgment arguing that

6

Although the Members of CCD were clearly on notice in early September that
Millsap was anticipating retirement. See R. 469-470.
11

because he had retired and was no longer a "member," he could not be expelled pursuant
to the Utah expulsion provision. See generally, R. 197-200, 201-231.
24.

In a pleading dated March 25, 2002, CCD responded and cross-motioned

for summary judgment, stating that expulsion on various theories. See generally R. 236238, 239-470.
25.

After briefing by both parties, oral argument was held before the district

court on June 6,2002. At this time, the district court made an oral ruling and granted
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff CCD. See Tr. at 24-30. See also, R. 509. The
district court orally reasoned that:
a.

Millsap lost his right to retire by taking from the company's

trust account, see Tr. at 25-26, 28-29;
b.

That the legislature could not have meant for someone that

engages in such conduct to be able to exercise their rights under the company's operating
agreement, see Tr. at 25, 28- 29 ; and
c.

That expulsion became effective at the very moment Millsap

initially engaged in the wrongful conduct, see Tr. at 30.
26.

The district court requested that Plaintiffs counsel prepare proposed

findings of facts and conclusions of law which were sent to Defendant. See Tr. at 26:17;
R. 509.
27.

On July 2, 2002, before afinalorder was signed, Millsap objected to the

Plaintiffs proposed findings and order, arguing that several of the proposedfindingsof
fact and conclusions of law were never argued before the district court, were not
12

supported by the facts, and did not reflect the district court's analysis. Millsap also noted
that some of the proposed findings of fact were clearly disputed and could not be decided
as a matter of summary judgment. See R. 510-521; 522-533.
28.

Contemporaneously, and prior to the signing of any judgment, Millsap

moved the district court to reconsider its oral grant of summary judgment and provided
supplemental evidence. In doing so, Millsap urged that the court's theory that statutory
expulsion became effective the moment Millsap first misused monies and breached the
initial Operating Agreement was erroneous. See id.
29.

Although an objection hearing was originally scheduled, see R. 534-

535, without further hearing the district court signed the Plaintiffs proposed judgment
and granted summary judgment in favor of CCD on September 3, 2002.7 See R. 585,
586-591,592-594,599.
30.

In doing so, the district court adopted CCD's proposed order with the

following conclusions of law:
a.

Millsap materially breached the Operating Agreement and the

Amendment, and based upon the first breach rule of law, he is not entitled to enforce the
terms of either the Operating Agreement or the Amendment, see R. 589, f 1;
b.

Millsap's conduct was wrongful and it adversely and

materially affected CCD's business, see R. 589, %1\
c.

The intent of the Utah State Legislature when it enacted

7

A copy of the "Judgment" and "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" are
attached as "Addendum D."
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Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710 was to enable a company to expel members from
membership in a limited liability company where wrongful acts occur and where a
complaint is filed before a member withdraws, see R. 589, | 3 ;
d.

Millsap should be expelled as a member of CCD pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-708(l)(e) and 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (b), see R. 589, f4;
e.

There are genuine issues of material fact about whether New-

man and Stanley were fraudulently induced to enter into the Amendment, see R. 589, f5.
Material Disputed Facts Remaining
31.

There remains material disputed facts on the following issues that may

impact this Court's determination of this case.
32.

There are disputed material facts regarding whether the Members of CCD

were "fraudulently induced" into entering the Amendment to the Operating Agreement.
SeeR. 589, f5.
33.

There are disputed material facts regarding the district court's finding that

Millsap attempted to retire from CCD only after the Complaint in this matter had been
filed. SeeR. 589,1f3.8
throughout this litigation, Millsap has contended that he gave formal notice of
retirement on October 16, 2002. However, as noted above, CCD and its members clearly
were put on notice prior to the filing of the Complaint that Millsap was anticipating
retirement and requested an appraisal of his profit share. The actual date of retirement
never really became important until the district court, in adopting CCD's findings,
seemingly set the filing of the Complaint as the bright line cutoff date from which
Millsap could no longer exercise his retirement rights. As such, there is a question of fact
regarding whether the prior September notice requesting an appraisal in anticipation of
retirement sufficiently put CCD on notice as to bar a claim for expulsion. In the very
least, the chronology clearly shows that Millsap anticipated retirement and put CCD on
14

34.

There are material disputed facts as to whether Millsap "materially

breached" the Amendment to the Operating Agreement, and thus forfeited his right to
reinstatement of his membership status as outlined in the Amendment. More specifically:
a.

CCD contends that Millsap's authority to write checks or

withdraw funds was eliminated by the terms of the Amendment and therefore his doing
so breached the Amendment. See R. 253-254 (stating that Millsap's unauthorized use of
trust account funds constituted material breach of the Amendment).
b.

To the contrary, Millsap has asserted three responses

throughout this litigation:
i.

First, that the Amendment very clearly provides that

his membership rights are reinstated upon completion of a single set of conditions: the
repayment of the Newman Loan; the one year passage of time; and no further
amendments to the Operating Agreement. See R. 221, J C; R. 522-528
ii.

Second, the realities of the business required Millsap

to write hundreds of checks from the trust account for legitimate business purposes after
the Amendment was signed. All checks were written with the complete knowledge and
approval of his partners. See R. 478,1f 11; R. 488-489; R. 525-526; 531-532.
iii.

Third, that Millsap has admitted wrongfully writing

notice prior to CCD's race to the courthouse.
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two checks for his personal use which were made known to the members immediately,
and the funds were immediately repaid. Importantly, the members continued to act under
the Amendment. See R. 478, f 11; R. 488.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In its simplest form, Millsap may not, as a matter of law and pursuant to the plain
language of the applicable statutes, be "expelled" pursuant to the expulsion provision of
the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act, codified in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c710. On its face, the expulsion provision applies only to "members" of an LLC, and at
the time he was judicially expelled, Millsap had already voluntarily disassociated from
CCD through retirement and was no longer a member as contemplated by the statute.
Therefore, the district court should have granted summary judgment in favor of Millsap.
What will muddy the simplicity of the argument, however, is CCD's assertion that
Millsap lost his right to retire based on asserted "material breaches" of those agreements
that provided the retirement rights.
However, rather than taking action to expel Millsap at an appropriate time, the
members of CCD voluntarily entered into an agreement with Millsap which would serve
the interests of all parties. The agreement would guarantee that all the misused funds
were returned in very short order, and if not, Millsap would lose all of his interest in the
company. On the other hand, the agreement allowed Millsap to make amends for his
wrongdoing and, eventually, if he repaid the money as specifically set forth in the
agreement and waited a one-year "waiting period," Millsap would regain all his interests
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and rights in the company which he helped create and make successful, including his
right to retire.
Millsap met the terms of this agreement: he repaid the monies, waited the one
year period, and regained his rights as a Member of CCD. In anticipation of regaining
his rights, Millsap requested information regarding the value of his share of the company.
At that point, CCD "raced to the courthouse" and filed a lawsuit seeking expulsion. Such
action was not an attempt to remove an individual endangering the company from his
participation in the running of the business. Indeed, Millsap hadn't participated in the
operation of the company for almost a year. Rather, such action was a bad-faith attempt
to procure Millsap's profit-share interest in the company.
Finally, this Court should reject CCD's arguments and the district court findings
which convert Utah's expulsion statute into a weapon which can and will be wrongfully
used by expelling members simply to enhance profit share.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CCD AND JUDICIALLY EXPELLING
MILLSAP.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and. . .the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ^[15. In ruling on motion for
summary judgment, the "trial court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility."
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258,
1261 (Utah 1984). "Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be
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construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Id.
Finally, when a trial judge sees fit to make and enter findings and conclusions, a grant of
summary judgment is precluded where there is an existence of material issues of fact. See
id.
Based on this standard, the district court erred in denying Millsap's motion for
summary judgment, and finding in favor of CCD.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING
THE UTAH REVISED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
ACT IN EXPELLING MILLSAP

The district court erred in denying Millsap's motion for summary judgment since
Millsap may not be expelled as a matter of law. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710 9 provides a
basis by which an LLC may obtain the forced ousting of a member. The Utah expulsion
provision provides that:
A member of a company may be expelled:
(1) as provided in the company's operating agreement;
(2) by unanimous vote of the other members if it is unlawful to
carry on the company's business with the member; or
(3) on application by the company or another member, by
judicial determination that the member:
(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and
materially affected the company's business;
(b) has willfully or persistently committed a material breach of
the articles of organization or operating agreement or of a duty
owed to the company or to the other members under Section
48-2c-807; or
(c) has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business
which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the
business with the member.

9

This statute will hereinafter be referred to as the "Utah expulsion provision."
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Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710.
In its oral ruling favoring CCD and judicially expelling Millsap based on this
provision, the district court reasoned that Millsap could be judicially expelled due to his
initial taking from CCD's trust account, that the legislature could not have meant for
someone that engages in such conduct to be able to exercise their rights under a
corporation's Operating Agreement, and importantly, that expulsion became effective at
the moment Millsap initially engaged in the wrongful conduct.
Further, in the adopted written conclusions of law regarding the interpretation of
the Utah expulsion provision, and over the objection of Millsap, the district court found
that: 1) 'The intent of the Utah State Legislature when it enacted Utah Code Ann. § 482c-710 was to enable a company, such as CCD, to expel members, such as Mr. Millsap,
from membership in the limited liability company where the wrongful acts occurred and
the Complaint was filed before the members withdrew from membership in the limited
liability company;" and 2) Mr. Millsap should be expelled as a member of CCD pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-708(l)(e) and 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (b). See R. 589,fflf3-4.
However, this Court should find that Millsap ceased being a "member" of CCD
upon retirement and prior to judicial expulsion. Therefore, as a matter of law and
pursuant to basic rules of statutory construction, Millsap may not be expelled pursuant to
the plain language of the Utah expulsion provision.
A.

The Plain Language Of The Utah Expulsion Provision
Does Not Authorize Expulsion On The Facts Of This Case,

Millsap's argument comes down to one simple and basic proposition: the plain
19

language of the Utah expulsion provision only allows an LLC to expel a "member."
Therefore, and perhaps to state the obvious, one cannot expel an individual who is no
longer a "member."
It is a well-accepted canon of statutory construction that courts are required to give
effect to the plain language of legislative enactments. In construing a statute, courts
assume that "each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Stephens v.
Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).
Further rationale behind the plain meaning rule of statutory construction is set
forth in Sutherland's, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a
statute is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. The courts owe fidelity to the will of the legislature.
What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered
the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Therefore,
the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of
the legislature.
Id. at § 46.03.
Utah's LLC statutory scheme, codified as the Utah Revised Limited Liability
Company Act, sets forth the manner in which a "member" of an LLC may voluntarily
withdraw from a corporation, and provides:
A member may withdraw from a company at the time or upon
the happening of events specified in and in accordance with
the articles of organization or operating agreement. If the
articles of organization or operating agreement do not specify the
time or the events upon the happening of which a member may
withdraw, a member may not withdraw prior to the dissolution
20

and completion of winding up of the company, without the
written consent of all other members at the time.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-709 (emphasis added).
Further, § 48-2c-708 provides that when such a "withdrawal" occurs,
membership ceases:
(1) A person who is a member of a company ceases to be a
member of the company.. .upon the occurrence of one or
more of the following events:
(c) the member withdraws by voluntary act from the company
as provided in Section 48-2c-709;
Utah Code. Ann. § 48-2c-708 (emphasis added).
Therefore, based on the plain language of the statutes above, and because the CCD
Operating Agreement contemplated withdrawal of a member through retirement as
evidenced in Paragraph 12 and other provisions throughout the Operating Agreement,
when Millsap delivered written notice of retirement to the other members of CCD, his
status as a member ceased. Consequently, because Millsap was no longer a "member,"
the Utah expulsion provision can not be used to expel him since the expulsion provision
only applies to "members." This is evidenced by the fact that the statute clearly states
that only "[a] member of a company may be expelled." Utah Code. Ann. § 48-2c-710
(emphasis added). The provision does not say an "individual," or an "employee," or use
any other term. The expulsion statute exclusively applies to "members" only.
Thus, the moment Millsap voluntarily retired from CCD, he ceased being a
"member." It therefore follows that because Millsap ceased being a member before
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any judicial determination otherwise, the expulsion statute does not apply and CCD's
expulsion claim must fail.
B.

The Intent Of Utah's Expulsion Statute Does Not Support
Expulsion Under The Circumstances of This Case.

Although the Utah expulsion provision is clear and unambiguous, and therefore,
the legislative intent does not come into play,11 the clear intent of "expulsion" is to
provide a mechanism of evicting a member who has engaged in conduct which has and
continues to disrupt and harm the company, and where this member refuses to
disassociate. It is a means for a company to deal with an ongoing disruption. It does not
make sense, therefore, to expel a member who has made amends for his wrongdoing and
who has already voluntarily disassociated, unless bad faith motives lurk in the
background.
L

The District Court's Interpretation of the
Utah Expulsion Provision Creates Bad
Public Policy. Will Lead to Unintended
Results and is Contrary to the Expressed
Intentions of the Legislature.

In this case, the district court entered an expulsion order on September 3, 2002.

10

The district court seemingly found that the filing of a claim prevents members
from retiring. However, judicial expulsion, although requiring an application by
members, only becomes effective upon the "judicial determination" that a "member" has
engaged in specified wrongdoing. Because, in this case, Millsap retired and ceased being
a member prior to any judicial determination, the Utah expulsion provision does not
apply.
n

See e.g., World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d
253, 259 (Utah 1994) ("Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language
need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations.").
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Prior to that date, it had been almost two years since Millsap was last physically present
on the premises of the company, and more than two years since the wrongful acts which
the district court found adversely and materially affected the company occurred. Clearly,
the expulsion was not based upon any ongoing threat to the company but as
punishment for prior acts some years earlier.
In ordering expulsion, the district court found "that the intent of the Utah
legislature when it enacted Utah Code Ann. 48-2c-710 was to enable a company to expel
members from membership in a limited liability company where wrongful acts occur and
where a complaint is filed before a member withdraws." See R. 589, ^3. Under that
analysis, in order to appropriate another member's interest and profit share in a company,
all that need be shown is that a complaint has been filed and that at some point in the
past the member engaged in wrongful conduct which materially and adversely affected
the company. There is absolutely no time limit regarding when the alleged wrongful
conduct occurred or was resolved. Thus, under the district court's analysis, events from
25 years ago may form the basis of an expulsion under which the ownership interest and
profit share of one member is eliminated and awarded to another member. In essence, a
new cause of action is created whereby one member may obtain another member's profit
share in the company if they can show the requisite wrongful conduct at any point in time
during the history of the company. Such is an unintended invitation for litigation between
members.
This problem is compounded by the district court's invitation for a race to the
courthouse. The touchstone created by the district court is the filing of the complaint.
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Any time it is anticipated that a member may give notice of withdrawal by retirement or
otherwise, the remaining members may simply eliminate the members contractual ability
to retire by the filing of a complaint.
Finally, the district court's ruling is contrary to the expressed intentions of the
legislature that the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act "be interpreted so as to
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability
of operating agreements of companies." Utah Code. Ann. § 48-2c-1901.12
The founding members of CCD, acting with the advice of counsel, made informed
decisions regarding restrictions on members' actions as well as the consequences for
those actions. The Operating Agreement likewise very clearly spells out a formula by
which a member can withdraw from the company and the rights and duties of all parties
should that occur. Indeed, with every LLC, one of the primary decisions made in regards
to the terms of the Operating Agreement is whether to allow members to withdraw and

12

In 2001, the Utah legislature repealed the Utah Limited Liability Company Act,
and replaced it with the new Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act. See Stan
Johnson, Article: Duties under the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act: Analysis
of a Statutory Conflict, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 551, 551. In doing so, the legislature
specifically set forth its intent that the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act "be
interpreted so as to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and
to the enforceability of operating agreements of companies." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c1901. Such intent to allow members of a company to contract is evidenced throughout
the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807
(evidencing intent of freedom to contract by setting forth provisions to follow "unless
otherwise provided in the articles of organization or an operating agreement"); id. at §
48-2c-708(2)(stating that the "articles of organization or operating agreement may
provide for other events or occurrences" which will result in a person ceasing to be a
member of the company).
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under what circumstances they can have their interests purchased by the other members
or the corporate entity.
If there had been an ongoing problem within CCD which justified the use of the
expulsion statute, then unquestionably, Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-120(f) would trump the
CCD Operating Agreement insofar as it provided that there could be no expulsion of a
member.13 However, in this case, the district court's expansive interpretation of the
expulsion statute had the effect of eviscerating significant portions of the CCD Operating
Agreement. By refusing to limit the expulsion statute to ongoing problems, the district
court gutted the agreement and effectively redefined the rights and duties of the
members.
The district court ruling, if adopted by this Court, would have a similar effect on
most, if not all, LLC operating agreements. They would be rendered partially void insofar
as they provide a remedy when a member has engaged in wrongful conduct which has
materially and adversely affected the company. Similarly, that portion of operating
agreements that spells out the circumstances under which a member may withdraw and
his interest be purchased is likewise rendered void after a complaint is filed alleging a
breach at some point during the history of the entity.
This result is contrary to the express desire of the legislature that the Act be
interpreted so as to give the maximum effect to the intentions of the authors of the

13

This makes sense. If expulsion is limited to ongoing problems, rather than
rewriting operating agreements, the Utah expulsion provision provides a new remedy that
is available in the event that there is an ongoing situation that cannot otherwise be solved.
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operating agreement. While, in this case, the district court's ruling may appeal to some
sense of equity given the egregiousness of Millsap's prior acts, the analysis of the district
court will lead to expansive litigation and contrary to the intent of the legislative drafters,
severely limits the ability of members to freely contract their own fate.

2±

Expulsion Not Intended to Provide Mechanism for
Bad Faith Appropriation of Member's Profit Share
Interests In Company.

Unfortunately, there is little or no legislative history surrounding the enactment of
the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act, and more specifically, the expulsion
provision itself and its purpose within the Utah scheme. However, in looking at the
purpose of "expulsion" in the general areas of partnership, corporation, and business law,
commentators note that expulsion must be carried out in good faith, and not for the
purpose of avoiding the costs of contractual agreements between partners or to provide a
mechanism for the wrongful withholding of a partner's financial stakes. In other words,
expulsion is inappropriate when done so that the remaining partners may appropriate the
expelled member's participation interest. Cf Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d
435, 443 (Ind. App. 1990) ("expelling partners act in 'good faith' regardless of
motivation if that act does not cause a wrongful withholding of money or property
legally due the expelled partner at the time he is expelled").
One commentator explains:
An expulsion right is exercised in good faith when it is done
for a purpose within the contemplation of the parties, such as
to protect partners from a partner who has become untrustworthy or to remove a partner who has made the cooperative
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operation of the business impossible... Where the expelling
partners act solely to enhance their own profit share,
however, they are seeking to avoid a cost of their original
agreement-the foregone opportunity to keep all the profit
for themselves.. .in the words of one plaintiff... "the risk we
took was that the business would not succeed. We did not
take the risk that the business would succeed so well that the
general partner would squeeze us out and take the investment
for himself."
Paula Dalley, Article: The Law of Partner Expulsions: Fiduciary Duty and Good Faith,
21 Cardozo L. Rev. 181, 201 (1999) (emphasis added). See also, 12A Fletcher Cyc Corp
§ 5700, at 742 (Perm Ed) ("The expulsion of a member, where brought for the mere
purpose of promoting the private interests of certain parties and to enable them to obtain
control of the property of the corporation is fraudulent and void"); 59 A Am.Jur.2d
Partnership § 514 (noting that in the exercise of a partnership's right to expel a partner,
"it must not appear that the partnership acts out of a desire to gain a business or property
advantage for the remaining partners in bad faith").
There is no doubt that Millsap engaged in wrongful conduct. There is also no
doubt that, pursuant to the terms of the Operating Agreement, Millsap is liable to CCD
for the damages of that wrongful conduct. But the question remains, does CCD have the
right to expel Millsap after he has disassociated from the company for the sole purpose of
cutting off his interests in a company? Or, is the true purpose of expulsion to evict and
take away control from an offending member to prevent further harm, rather than a grant
to demand the member's share of profit or sale distributions in a company he or she has
helped to build and make profitable?
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Further, as argued before the district court, just as it makes no sense for a creditor
to continue suit against a debtor after the debtor has paid in full, or for a landlord to
continue upon a claim for eviction of a tenant who has paid his rent and already left, it
likewise makes no sense for CCD to pursue this action and request that this Court expel
Millsap when Millsap has already left on his own accord. Simply put, CCD has refused
to take yes for an answer, and has done so for the "bad faith" purposes of attempting to
secure Millsap's share of the company for the personal gain of the other members.
2i

The Utah Expulsion Provision Is Not
"Self-Activating" and Expulsion Does
Not Automatically Occur at Time of
Wrong-doing.

Additionally, the Utah expulsion provision nowhere contemplates, as the district
court orally reasoned, that "expulsion" somehow automatically occurs at the moment a
wrongdoing occurs. "Expulsion" is not self-activating-expulsion is a process which must
be activated by the members, and in the case of the Utah scheme, "may" be judicially
determined. The members may engage in the expulsion process in a variety of ways,
including making express expulsion provisions in the company's operating agreement;
by obtaining a unanimous vote of the other members if it is unlawful to carry on the
company's business with the member; or by beginning the process and seeking a judicial
determination. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710. If no such actions occur, then, as
argued below, the corporation effectively waives its right to expel the member based on
the wrongdoing. Consequently, the district court's reasoning that the expulsion provision
was somehow self-enforcing and automatic is clearly erroneous, and counters the very
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concepts of freedom of contract and a corporation's right to internally handle corporate
affairs.
II.

THROUGH ITS MEMBERS, CCD WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO
EXPEL MILLSAP AND REFUSE PERFORMANCE OF THE
OPERATING AGREEMENT AND AMENDMENT.

The district court found in the adopted conclusions of law that "Mr Millsap
materially breached the Operating Agreement and the Amendment, and based upon the
"first breach" rule, he is not entitled to enforce any of the terms of either the Operating
Agreement or the Amendment." See R. 589, f l.14 The findings also state that Millsap's
conduct was wrongful and adversely and materially affected CCD's business. See R. 589,
1}2. Therefore, the written findings conclude that Millsap should be expelled as a
member of CCD pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-708(l)(e) and 48-2c-710(3)(a)
and(b). See R. 589, If 4.
However, these conclusions are erroneous for the following reasons.
A.

CCD Generally Waived Any Right to Expel

Undoubtedly, a corporation has the power to expel a member when conferred by
the laws of the state and/or the bylaws of the corporation. See 12A Fletcher Cyc Corp §
5696, at 722-723 (Perm Ed). Further, even though the Members of CCD contractually
provided in their Operating Agreement that no member of CCD could be expelled, it is
not argued that Millsap's actions in misusing monies could, if sought appropriately and
determined prior to Millsap's withdrawal from the corporation, serve as grounds for
l4

As set forth in more detail below, the district court did not find that Millsap
materially breached the Amendment to the Operating Agreement.
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judicial expulsion. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710 (listing the grounds for expulsion of
a member). See also, 12A Fletcher Cyc Corp § 5697, at 725-726 (Perm Ed.) (noting
general grounds for expulsion).
However, just as it is generally recognized that a corporation has the power to
expel, it is also recognized that a corporation may waive that right to expel a member and
does so "if the corporation consents to or acquiesces in an act." 12A Fletcher Cyc Corp §
5701, at 743 (Perm Ed). When the corporation does so acquiesce, "it cannot later expel
for the act." Id.
This case presents the "textbook" scenario of such a waiver situation. In this case,
CCD, through the members, knew and was fully aware of Millsap's misdeeds. However,
rather than seeking expulsion at that time, the members entered into a new agreementwillingly and voluntarily.15 This agreement allowed Millsap to make amends for his
wrongdoing, and repay the misused funds. Not until all of the funds were repaid-not until
Millsap had met all the terms of the amended agreement-not until Millsap had waited the
established one year period in order to regain his rights under the original Operating
Agreement-and not until Millsap requested an appraisal of his interest in CCD in
contemplation of having his rights restored, did CCD seek expulsion. The Members of
CCD did not seek expulsion for the benefit of the company. The Members of CCD did
not seek expulsion because Millsap posed a threat to the daily operation of the

15

CCD argued in the district court that the members were "fraudulently induced"
into entering into the Amendment. The district court found that there were material
disputed facts on this issue.
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corporation.16 Instead, the Members of CCD now undoubtedly seek expulsion in bad faith
and in an attempt to cut Millsap off from his financial interests in the corporation which
he worked endlessly to create. l7
Consequently, because CCD did not invoke its expulsion right in the beginning
and with first knowledge of Millsap's wrongdoing, but instead entered into a new
agreement allowing Millsap to make amends, this Court should find that CCD waived its
right to expel.
B.

CCD Waived Its Right To Refuse Performance
Based On The "First Breach Rule"And Therefore,
Millsap Retained His Right To Retire.
L

Millsap Has the Right to Enforce the Terms
Of the Operating Agreement

The district court reasoned that because Millsap materially breached the Operating
Agreement in the first instance through his misuse of funds from the CCD trust account,
he cannot thereafter enforce the terms of that contract. In other words, because Millsap
committed wrongdoing and breached first, CCD is no longer bound by the original
Operating Agreement and does not have to perform under the contract. See e.g., Fisher v.
Taylor, 572 P.2d 393, 395(Utah 1977) (applying first breach rule); Jackson v. Rich, 499
16

Indeed, if this were the case, they would have ousted Millsap from the beginning.

17

As noted in the district court, Newman and Stanley have not acted with the clean
hands characterized by the pleadings. Indeed, Newman and Stanley waited until Millsap
paid everything back, then attempted to force Millsap out of the company with threats of
notifying prosecutors in order to force him to submit to their demands and walk-away
from his interest in the company he built. See R. 488, n.12; R. 491. Only when Millsap
refused did CCD seek judicial expulsion in order to again attempt to obtain Millsap's
share of the company.
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P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1972) (setting forth general rule that a party first guilty of a material
breach cannot complain thereafter if a party refuses later performance). See also, 14
Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 43:5 (4th ed. 2000), at 563-577
(noting general rule that a party first in default under a contract cannot recover for the
other party's non-performance).
Such proposition may have been true if the members of CCD had wanted to refuse
performance and timely did so. Cf. Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1210
(Utah App. 1997) (recission only appropriate when done promptly on discovering facts
that justify rescission); Larsen v. Knight, 233 P.2d 365, 371 (Utah App. 1951) (noting
that a "party claiming a right ought not to appear to acquiesce in non-performance by the
other party until the time has gone by for such performance and then claim damages").18
Instead, CCD, through its members, "waived" their right to refuse performance based on
Millsap's breach by entering into a new agreement and setting forth conditions for
Millsap to follow in order to satisfy his wrongdoing. Upon meeting these conditions,
Millsap's rights would be reinstated under the initial Operating Agreement and its terms.
The specific undisputed facts indicate that while knowing about the misappropriation, the members of CCD did not give any type of notice or intent to permanently
terminate or refuse performance under the original Operating Agreement. Instead, on

18

Also compare 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 503 (noting that "contracts do not
terminate as a matter of course on a breach"); id. at § 510 ("the right to rescind must be
exercised within a reasonable time, or with reasonable promptness, after discovery of the
facts from which it arises" and "the important consideration being whether the period
has been long enough to result in prejudice to the other party") (emphasis added).
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April 21, 2000, the members entered into an amended agreement which temporarily
suspended Millsap's rights under the Operating Agreement. The Amendment provided
that upon Millsap's repayment of the monies, upon a one year waiting period, and upon
the condition that the Operating Agreement had not been further amended, that Millsap's
rights under the original Operating Agreement would be reinstated. All three of these
conditions were fulfilled. Thus, Millsap's full rights under the Operating Agreement
were restored, including his right to retire.
In essence, CCD and its members lost their power to refuse performance under the
original Operating Agreement since they manifested a willingness to go on with the
contract upon Millsap meeting certain conditions.19 See e.g., 13 Samuel Williston, A
Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 39:31 (4th ed. 2000), at 637 (explaining that a "party
to a contract may waive.. .a breach of the contract provisions, by conduct manifesting a

19

Cf. 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 503 ("there can be no rescission for a breach
where the breach has been waived by the injured party. And the doctrine is well
established that the breach of one contract does not justify the aggrieved party in
refusing to perform another separate and distinct contract") (emphasis added);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 380 ("loss of Power of Avoidance by Affirmance);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 85 (explaining that ratification of a new promise
after a voidable contract is binding); 14 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts § 43:15 (4th ed. 2000) ("election to proceed" where there has been a failure of
performance by one party to a contract, but the other party makes choice to continue the
contract, and "in effect waiv[es] the right to assert that the breach discharged any
obligation to perform").
While such terms as "recission," "avoidance," "accord and satisfaction," and
"election" are all conceptually distinct legal contract terms, all are similar in that they are
founded on the concept that when there is a breach, the non-breaching party has a choice.
When the non-breaching party makes the choice to continue and manifests a willingness
to proceed, the non-breaching party waives their right to assert that the breach discharged
their obligation to perform.
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continued recognition of the contract's existence after learning of the breach.. .such as by
continuing to perform or accepting performance under the contract and receiving the
benefit of it"); id. § 39:27, at 621 (stating that the "well-known rule regarding waiver of
contractual requirements [is that a] party to a contract may. . .by his own course of
conduct waive [the] legal right to insist on strict performance of the covenants of the
contract") (citations omitted); id. § 39:30, at 631-633 (explaining that implied waiver
may be established "by a party's conduct which is inconsistent with the assertion of the
right to performance.. .or by conduct which indicates that strict compliance.. .will not be
required."). Also compare, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281 (accord and
satisfaction where party promises to accept a stated performance in satisfaction of other
party's duty).
2.

Millsap Has The Right To Enforce The Terms
of the Amendment to the Operating Agreement.

The written adopted findings also contend that Millsap "materially breached" the
Amendment rendering it nonenforceable. Insofar as the district court adopted the written
findings that Millsap "materially" breached the Amendment, Millsap asserts that the
district court made no such finding during its oral decision. Further, any alleged breach of
the Amendment stemming from Millsap's continued writing of checks is not a "material
breach" as contemplated by the Amendment to the Operating Agreement and as a matter
of law. Alternatively, if this Court finds an implied breach in Millsap's continued writing
of checks, then the Court should find nevertheless, that CCD, through its members, again
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waived their right to refuse performance on the amended Operating Agreement by
condoning, and authorizing, Millsap's conduct of which they now complain.

a.

The finding of a "material breach" of the
Amendment to the Operating Agreement does
not reflect the district court's view.

In written memorandum before the district court, CCD contended that Millsap
materially breached the Amendment to the Operating Agreement in that Millsap
continued to sign and endorse checks contrary to language in the Amendment. See R.
253. In written response, Millsap rebutted that such conduct was immediately made
known to the other members, and that despite contrary language in the Amendment, the
practice of the parties continued to allow Millsap to sign checks due to the practicalities
of the business. See R. 488, 513, 519-520.
During oral argument on the motion, the parties mentioned only in passing the
alleged breach of the Amendment to the Operating Agreement. Notably, the district
court found the allegations "immaterial." Indeed, the district court began the hearing by
stating that the allegations that
after the amendment was signed and the checks were written
in violation of the amendment and the agreement between the
parties, that there was still efforts made by Mr. Millsap to try
to rescue the sinking ship that he had created. . .1 don't really
think that those things are all that material to the analysis
that the court has to look at.
Tr. at 4:5-12 (emphasis added).
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This becomes most apparent in the fact that the Court wished to base its decision
on the statutory route of the expulsion statute, and ultimately did so, despite the findings
prepared by the plaintiff. See Tr. at 25-30 (basing decision on the expulsion statute,
discussing intent of legislature, stating that Millsap's resignation is a nullity, and
clarifying that an expulsion occurs not upon a court ruling, but at the moment a bad act
occurs ).20
b.

Millsap met the three clear conditions precedent
necessary to regain his rights.

"When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the contract's four corners to

20

Throughout the hearing, the district court summarized and clarified the parties'
statutory positions, and seemingly led the argument away from fact-intensive issues. See
e.g., Tr. 4:13-25 (looking at "real legal question" as whether resignation moots expulsion
under statute; 5:3-15 (court summarizing Millsap's position that resignation occurring
before expulsion moots expulsion); 5:16-25 (court attempting to summarize plaintiffs
position that expulsion is statutory right); 6:1-9 (same); 7:4-22 (court summarizing more
fact intensive breach "decision tree"); 25:6-25 (noting court's opinion based on
legislature's statutory expulsion concept); 26:1-14 (same).
Although the district court did say that, as a back-up, it found support for
summary judgment under the "first breach theory," the district court did not clarify
whether this was a breach of the original Operating Agreement, the Amendment, or both.
SeeTv. at 26:14-16.
Subsequently, after receiving Plaintiffs proposed findings, Millsap objected to the
proposed findings and moved the court to reconsider its ruling. See R. 522-533. Therein,
Millsap specifically objected to the finding that Millsap breached the Amendment.
R. 523. However, later in arguing for reconsideration, the defendant stated that "in its
oral ruling the Court seemingly adopted the first breach rule in refusing to allow Mr.
Millsap to enforce the Amendment to the Operating Agreement." R. 527. In doing so,
Millsap never intended on stipulating that the court made a finding of a breach of the
amended agreement, but merely used poor word choice. See also R. 579-581, at 581, n.2.
Instead, Millsap argued that even if this was a consideration of the court, there were
questions of facts as to whether any alleged breach was material and appropriate for
summary judgment. Such statement does not waive Defendant Specific Objection that the
court made no such specific finding that Millsap materially breached the Amendment.
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determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling." Fairbourne Commercial, Inc. v.
American Housing, 68 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Utah App. 2003). "If the language within the
four corners of the contract is unambiguous, then a court does not resort to extrinsic
evidence of the contract's meaning, and a court determines the parties' intentions from
the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law." Id. (citing Bakowski v.
Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62,f16).
In this case, the Amendment to the Operating Agreement is clear and specifically
sets forth three conditions precedent that, if met, would enable Millsap to regain his
rights under the Operating Agreement.21 Millsap was required to pay back the
Newman Loan, wait one year, and there could be no further amendments to the
Operating Agreement. If these three conditions occurred, Millsap's rights were to be
restored. SeeTr. 21.
The provision in the Amendment could not be more clear, and indeed, if the
parties had wanted to link Millsap's reinstatement of rights to a check-writing
prohibition, they would have said so.
c.

If this Court implies the check writing
prohibition as a fourth condition precedent,
then summary judgment is inappropriate.

As noted above, CCD reasons that Millsap "materially breached" the Amendment
and therefore cannot enforce its terms. CCD bases this breach of the Amendment on
21

See 13 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 38:7 (4th ed.
2000), at 402-403 (defining condition precedent and noting that "A condition precedent
of a contract is one which calls for the performance of some act, after the contract is
entered into, and upon performance of which its obligations are made to depend").
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checks written by Millsap in contradiction to terms in the Amendment stating that he had
no authority to do so. However, any alleged breach is not material, was not a condition
precedent to Millsap's regaining of rights, and may become a matter of disputed fact that
would make summary judgment inappropriate.22
"What constitutes a material breach is a question of fact." Coalville City v.
Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Utah App. 1997) (citing cases). Further, a "material
breach" has been characterized as "a failure of performance which defeats the very object
of the contract or is of such prime importance that the contract would not have been made
if default in that particular had been contemplated." Id, Finally, "A breach which goes to
22

In fact, this case poses a clear example of the distinction between a "promise"
and a "condition." Williston explains:
The distinction between a promise or covenant on the one
hand, and a condition on the other, both in their legal effect
and in their wording, is obvious and familiar. A promise is a
manifestation of an intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made as to justify the promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made, while a
condition is an event, not certain to occur, which must
occur. . .before performance under a contract becomes due.
13 Samuel Williston, A treatise on the Law of Contracts § 38:5 (4th ed. 2000), at 382.
Williston continues to distinguish the legal effect:
If there is a condition precedent, the party in whose favor the condition
exists is not liable to an action until the condition has been met. Breach of a
promise, on the other hand, subjects the promisor to liability in damages,
but does not necessarily excuse performance on the other side.
Nonoccurrence of a condition prevents the promisee from acquiring a right,
or deprives him or her of one, but subjects him or her to no liability.
Id.
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only part of the consideration, is incidental and subordinate to the main purpose of the
contract..." Id. (citation omitted).
Again, as noted above, it seems clear that the three material provisions are the
three conditions specifically set forth that enable Millsap to regain his rights. These three
conditions did not include the subordinate check-writing provision. Indeed, the main
purpose of the contract was to repay the funds in an expedited manner. That goal was
accomplished. However, if this Court looks beyond the clear words of the contract, and
attempts to determine the intent of the parties in drafting the check writing provision and
its "materiality," then the issue raises disputed issues of material fact which makes
summary judgment inappropriate.
d.

CCD waived any right to refuse performance of
the Amendment to the Operating Agreement.

Alternatively, even if this Court finds that the check-writing prohibition was
"material" to the Amendment, then this Court should nevertheless find that CCD waived
any right to non-performance under the contract. While Millsap admits that he again
endorsed checks from the trust account, such actions were not only necessary due to the
realities of the business, but were known and authorized by the members of CCD. Again,
based on the points and authorities set forth above, if CCD wanted to refuse performance
based on an alleged material breach, they should have done so at an appropriate time.
Importantly, according to the Amendment and one of the clear material conditions, the
members had the opportunity to further "amend the agreement" based on their belief
Millsap wrongfully continued to write checks. Such would have prohibited Millsap from
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regaining his rights. Instead, the members continued to operate under the Amendment
and as such, waived any assumed right to refuse performance.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should find that Millsap had the right, and
properly retired as a member of CCD. As such, this Court should also find that based on
this retirement, Millsap is no longer a member as contemplated by the Utah expulsion
provision, and therefore as a matter of law, may not be judicially expelled. Consequently,
this Court should grant summary judgment on the expulsion issue in favor of Appellant
Millsap.
DATED this

u

day of June 2002.

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Aj^N MARIE TALIAFERRO
ittorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

48-2c-708, Cessation of membership.
(1) A person who is a member of a company ceases to be a member of the
company and the person or the person's successor in interest attains the status
of an assignee as set forth in Section 48-2c-1102, upon the occurrence of one or
more of the following events:
(a) the death of the member, except that the member's personal
representative, executor, or administrator may exercise all of the member's rights for the purpose of settling the member's estate, including any
power of an assignee and any power the member had under the articles of
organization or operating agreement;
(b) the incapacity of the member, as defined in Subsection 75-1-201(22),
except that the member's guardian or conservator or other legal representative may exercise all of the member's rights for the purpose of administering the member's property, including any power of an assignee and
any power the member had under the articles of organization or operating
agreement;
(c) the member withdraws by voluntary act from the company as
provided in Section 48-2c-709;
(d) upon the assignment of the member's entire interest in the company;
(e) the member is expelled as a member pursuant to Section 48-2c-710;
or
(f) unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, or with the
written consent of all other members:
(i) at the time the member:
(A) makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors;
(B) files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy;
(C) becomes the subject of an order for relief in bankruptcy
proceedings;
(D) files a petition or answer seeking for the member any
reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or similar relief under any statute, law, or
regulation;
(E) files an answer or other pleading admitting or failing to
contest the material allegations of a petition filed against the
member in any proceeding of the nature described in Subsections
(D(fXiXA) through (D); or
(F) seeks, consents to, or acquiesces in the appointment of a
trustee, receiver, or liquidator of the member or of all or, any
substantial part of the member's properties;
(ii) 120 days after the commencement of any proceeding against the
member seeking reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or similar relief under any statute, law,
or regulation, the proceeding has not been dismissed, or if within 90
days after the appointment without his or her consent or acquiescence
of a trustee, receiver, or liquidator of the member or of all or any
substantial part of the member's properties, the appointment is not
vacated or stayed, or within 90 days after the expiration of any stay,
the appointment is not vacated;
(iii) in the case of a member that is another limited liability
company, the filing of articles of dissolution or the equivalent for that
company or the judicial dissolution of that company or the administrative dissolution of that company and the lapse of any period
allowed for reinstatement;
(iv) in the case of a member that is a corporation, the filing of
articles of dissolution or the equivalent for the corporation or the
administrative dissolution of the corporation and the lapse of any
period allowed for reinstatement; or
(v) in the case of a member that is a limited partnership, the
dissolution and commencement of winding up of the limited partnership.
(2) The articles of organization or operating agreement may provide for
other events the occurrence of which result in a person's ceasing to be a
member of the company.
History: C. 1953,48-2c-708, enacted by L.
2001, ch. 260, § 84.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 260, §
197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001.

48-2c-709. Withdrawal of a member.
A member may withdraw from a company at the time or upon the happening
of events specified in and in accordance with the articles of organization or
operating agreement. If the articles of organization or operating agreement do
not specify the time or the events upon the happening of which a member may
withdraw, a member may not withdraw prior to the dissolution and completion
of winding up of the company, without the written consent of all other members
at the time.
History: C. 1953,48-2c-709, enacted by L.
2001, ch. 260, § 85.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 260, §
197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001.

48-2c-710. Expulsion of a member.
A member of a company may be expelled:
(1) as provided in the company's operating agreement;
(2) by unanimous vote of the other members if it is unlawful to carry on
the company's business with the member; or
(3) on application by the company or another member, by judicial
determination that the member:
(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially
affected the company's business;
(b) has willfully or persistently committed a material breach of the
articles of organization or operating agreement or of a duty owed to
the company or to the other members under Section 48-2c-807; or
(c) has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business
which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business
with the member.
History: C. 1953,48-2c-710, enacted by L.
2001, ch. 260, § 86.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 260, §
197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)

ADDENDUM B

OPERATING ACSBBEMBNT
THIS AGREEMENT made this /

day of October, 1994, between CRAIG

NEWMAN of Salt take City, Utah, DOUG STANUEY of Salt Lake City, Utah and CHRIS
MILLSAP of St. George, Utah (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Members").
RECITALS
A.

The Members desire to join together for the pursuit of common business

B.

The Members have considered various forms of joint business enterprises

goals.

for their business activities.
C.

The Members desire to enter into an Operating Agreement for the operation

of their Limited Liability Company, CDC, LC.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained herein the
Members agree as follows:
1.

Name and Domicile, The name of the Limited Liability Company shall be

CDC, L.C. as set forth in the Articles of Organization of the company. The principal place
of business shall be at St. George, Washington County, State of Utah, unless relocated
by a majority consent of the Members.
2.

Articles of Organization. All of the terms and conditions of the Articles of

Organization of the company are incorporated herein.

I

3.

Books and Records. Adequate accounting records of all company business

shall be kept, and these shall be open to Inspection by any of the Members at all
reasonable times. The company shall maintain its accounting records and shall report
for income tax purposes on the cash basis of accounting. The books and records of the
company shall be kept on a fiscal year basis. At the end of each fiscal year, a complete
accounting of the affairs of the company shall be furnished to each Member, together with
such appropriate information as may be required by each Member for the purpose of
preparing his income tax for that year. Such books and records shall be maintained in
accordance with acceptable accounting practices, consistently applied and may, as the
Members shall mutually agree, be kept on a cash basis.
4.

Capital Contributions. Cash amounts and other contributions have been

contributed by the respective Members to the capital of the company. The interest of
each Member in the capital and profit and losses of the Company shall be as follows:
MEMBER NAME

5.

% OF INTEREST

Craig Newman
Doug Stanley

33 1/3%
33 1/3%

Chris Millsap

33 1/3%

Capital Accounts. A capital account shall be maintained for each Member.

Each Member's share of the Company's profits or losses shall not be credited or debited
to its respective capital account, but shall be credited or debited to a separate profit and
loss account maintained for the Members.
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The capital account maintained by the

Company for each Member shall include original capital contributions by the Member and
any additional capital the Member is required to contribute to the Company. The account
shall be used to determine any required repayment of capital.

Any distributions to

Members in reduction of the capital shall decrease the amount in said capital accounts.
6.

Profits and, losses.
A.

The net profits or losses of the Company and each item of income,

gain, loss, deduction, credit or tax preference shall be divided among and charged
against a Member by allocating each such item in proportion to the percentage
interest in capital profits and losses set forth in Section 5 above. The division of
net profits shall only be disbursed so long as a minimum amount of $100,000 is
held in the accounts of the Company, except that salary to a Member acting as
manager may be paid even if the minimum profit amount is not held by the
Company.
B.

The Members intend for purposes of income tax allocation that the

profits and losses of the Company and each item of income, gain, loss, deduction,
credit or tax preference, including depreciation, if any, shall be allocated among
the Members in the proportion of their interests in profits and losses of the
Company as specified in Section 4 above.
C.

The "net profits" and "net losses" of the Company and each item of

income, gain, loss, deduction, credit or tax preference shall be determined in
3

accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied.
7.

Administrative Provisions.
A.

Operation. The initial manager of the Company shall be Chris Millsap

who shall act as a manager for the day-to-day affairs of the Company. Each
Member shall have an equal voice in the management of the Company business;
but all business procedures and operations will be conducted on the basis of the
majority consent of the Members.
B.

Time Devoted to Company. Each Member shall devote such time

to the Company business as the manager or managers shall determine is
necessary, with such exceptions as may be agreed upon by the majority consent
of the Members. It is anticipated that Chris Millsap will work full time in St. George
and that Doug Stanley and Craig Newman will work primarily in Salt Lake County.
Unless agreed to unanimously by the Members, said work locations shall continue
during the term of this Agreement.
C.

Allocation of Responsibilities. The initial duties and responsibilities

of the Members shall include, but not be limited to the following:
Chris Millsap - generating business and managing the St. George
Office;
Doug Stanley -

training of personnel, title and underwriting

responsibilities;
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Craig Newman -

training of escrow personnell and financial

responsibilities.
D.

Bank Accounts. One or more Company bank accounts may be

established and checks on the accounts may be signed for Company purposes by
any designated Member. Such savings accounts as the Members shall detennine
is desirable and withdrawals therefrom shall be made by such individuals as the
Members shall designate. The trust account of the Company shall require one
Member's signature on the checks. Employees may be designated to sign on the
trust account upon approval by the Members. The general operating account of
the Company shall require two Member's signatures on each check.
E.

Restrictions on Members. No Member, without the majority consent

of the Members, shall:
i. borrow or lend money on behalf of the Company;
ii.

execute any mortgage, bond or lease;

iii.

assign, transfer or pledge any debts due the Company or

release any debts due except on payment in full;
iv.

compromise any claim due to the Company or submit to

arbitration any dispute or controversy involving the Company;
v.

sell, assign, pledge or mortgage his interest in the Company;
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vi.

accept any contract for work or perform any act or make any

decision with respect to management or operation of the Company,
vii.

use the name, credit or property of the Company for any

purpose other than a proper Company purpose;
vlii, do any act detrimental to the Company business or which would
make it impossible to carry on the business;
Ix.

make any major purchase other than purchases necessary in

the ordinary course of the business of the Company.
In the event any Member should violate the above listed restrictions, said Member shall
become liable to the Company for the amount of the claim incurred by the Company in
connection with said violation of the restriction. The Members of the Company shall have
such other legal rights and remedies for said violation as may exist under Utah law.
F.

Employees.

Upon majority consent the Company may hire

employees for such duties and compensation as may be agreed to by a majority
of the Members.
G.

Meetings. Regular meetings of the Company shall be held at least

six (6) times per year, or more often as determined by the Company. Notice of the
time and place of each regular meeting shall be given in writing by the manager
or managers to each Member at least one week before such meeting. Special
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meetings may be called by the manager on such notice as may be determined by
such manager.
8.

Titles. The Company shall create such titles and positions for individuals

and/or Members as shall be determined to be advantageous to the Company. Such titles
and positions shall be created by majority consent of the Members.
9.

Salaries to Members.

No salary shall be paid to any Member for his

services to the Company unless otherwise agreed by the unanimous consent of the
Members in writing. Prior to any Member or individual receiving any compensation for
services rendered to the Company, the manager shall review with all Members of the
Company the need for such compensated positions and the reason why said position
should be filled by Company members and not employees of the Company.
10.

Custody of Securities. Securities, bonds, deeds of trust and mortgages

owned by the Company and registered in its name shall be in the primary custody of the
manager. The securities and bonds owned by the Company and not registered in its
name shall be kept In the custody of the brokerage firm through which they were
purchased.
11.

Admission of New Members.

The admission of new Members to the

Company is authorized by this Agreement and shall be accomplished by the unanimous
approval of Members of the Company. A supplemental agreement shall be created prior
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to admission of a new Member to the Company. This supplemental agreement shall
provided, as a minimum, the following:
A.

The contributions to Company capital required of the new Member:

B.

His percentage interests in the Company;

C.

Any special offices or duties of the new Member shall have in the

Company;
D.

The adjusted percentage of interests in the Company of all existing

Members based on the new partner's contribution.
E.

The amounts of each Partner's capital account on the date of the

new partner's entry.
AH Members, including the new Member, shall execute the supplemental agreement,
which shall become effective on the date signed by the last Member. The supplemental
agreement shall then be attached to this Agreement as an Exhibit.
12.

Retirement or Death of a Member.
A.

Effect of Retirement or Death. The Company shall not terminate by

the retirement or death of a Member.
B.

Winding Up of the Company. Upon the retirement or death of a

Member, the Company, may, at its option, exercisable in writing, purchase and
retire all or part of the interest of the retiring or the deceased Member, as the
case may be, and continue the Company business under its present name. The
a

Company's election to purchase such Company interest shall be exercised by
giving written notice thereof to the retiring Member or to the Personal
Representative of the deceased Member within thirty days after the effective date
of retirement or within ninety days after the date of death, as the case may be, and
the Company shall thereby be obligated to make the payments as specified in
Section 15 hereof.
If the Company shall elect not to purchase any or all of such Company
interest, any or all of the remaining Members shall have the right to purchase the
remainder of such Company interest as to which the Company has not elected to
purchase, provided that the remaining Members elect to purchase such Company
interest by giving written notice thereof to the retiring Member or to the Personal
Representative of the deceased Member within thirty days following the last date
available to the Company to make its election, the remaining Members shall
thereby be obligated to make the payments as specified in Section 14 hereof. The
remaining Members desiring to purchase a portion of such remaining Company
interest shall each be allowed to purchase such portion of such remaining interest
which is proportionate to the ratio of his Company interest to the total of the
Company interest of the Members desiring to purchase portions of such interest.
The excess of such remaining interest available for purchase caused by the failure
of a Member to purchase the maximum portion allowed to him by the preceding
9

sentence shall be available for purchase by each such Member desiring to
purchase a portion of it in an amount proportionate to the ratio of each such
Partner's Company interest to the total of the Company interests to the Members
desiring to purchase such excess.
If neither the Company nor the remaining Members elect to purchase the
Company interest of the retiring or deceased Member in accordance with this
paragraph, the Company shall be wound up and all its properties distributed in
liquidation pursuant to Section 16 hereof.
C.

Sale of a Company Interest.
I.

No Member shall sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of all or

any part of his Company interest.

Any attempt at such transfer or

disposition will, at the option of the remaining Members, result in the
dissolution of the Company and any such transfer shall become null and
void and of no force and effect.
ii.

In the event of the insolvency or bankruptcy of any Member,

or in the event the Company interest of a Member is subject to a judicial
sale under the laws of any local, state or Federal government, the Member
in question shall forthwith, within five days of such event, give written notice
of such event to the Company and the remaining Members, shall have an
option to purchase the interest of the debtor Member at any time within five
10

days of receipt of said notice of the price specified in Section 14. This
option shall be exercised by giving written notice of exercise to the Member
in question and another executive or judicial officer, if appropriate. Payment
for the interest of the debtor Member shall be made in accordance with the
provisions of Section 15.
13.

Expulsion of Members. No Member may be expelled from the Company by

act or desire of the remaining Members.
14.

Valuation of the Interest of a Retiring of Deceased Member.
A.

Valuation. The value of a Member's interest in Company property for

purposes of Section 12 shall be the value as determined by mutual agreement of
the Members (or their representatives). In the absence of such agreement, such
interest shall be appraised by two independent appraisers, one selected by the
retiring Member or the Personal Representative of the deceased Member, and one
by the Members. In the event that the two appraisers are unable to agree on the
value of the retiring or deceased Partner's Interest, they shall jointly appoint a third
independent appraiser and use the average of all three appraisals which average
shall be final and binding.
B.

Expeditious Determination of Valuation. The Members agree that

they will proceed as expeditiously as possible In determining the value of the

li

Interest of a Member which is to be acquired pursuant to the terms of this
agreement.
15.

Terms of Payment.

When a Company interest has been transferred and

purchased pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, payment for the value of such
interest in the Company, as determined under Section 14, shall be made by delivery of
a promissory note bearing interest at the rate of 10% per annum with interest and
principal payable in annual installments for a period not less than five years nor greater
than twenty years or upon such other terms and conditions as are mutually acceptable
to the parties or their representatives.
16.

Voluntary Pjsso|ution.
A.

Events of Dissolution, The Company shall be dissolved upon the first

to occur of the following events:
i.

Upon the death or retirement of a Member, unless the

Company is continued by the purchase of such Partner's interest and in
accordance with the provisions of Section 12B.
ii.

The sale or other disposition of ail of the Company property

and receipt of all of the proceeds from such sale(s).
jii.
B.

Upon the unanimous agreement of the Members.

Winding up the Company. On any dissolution, the Company shall

immediately commence to wind up its affairs. The Members shall continue to

share profits and losses during liquidation in the same proportions as before
dissolution. The proceeds from liquidation of Company assets shall be applied as
follows:
i.

Debts of the Company, other than to Members,

it

Amounts owed to Members for unpaid salaries, if any.

iii.

The capital contributions of the Members as reflected in their

respective capital accounts.
C.

Gains or Losses in Winding Up. Any gain or loss on disposition of

Company properties in the process of liquidation shall be credited or charged to
the Members in the proportion of their interest in profits or losses. Any property
distributed in Kind in the liquidation shall be valued and treated as though the
property were sold and the cash proceeds were distributed.

The difference

between the value of property distributed in kind and its book value shall be
treated as a gain or loss on sale of the property and shall be credited or charged
to the Members in the proportions of their interest in profits or losses as specified
in Section 4.
D.

Balance Owed by a Member. Should any Member have a debit

balance in his capital account, whether by reason of losses in liquidating Company
assets or otherwise, the debit balance shall represent an obligation from him to the
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other Members, to be paid in cash within thirty days of written demand by the
other Members.
17.

Amendment of Company Agreement, This Agreement shall not be amended

without the unanimous written consent of the Members.
18.

Waiver of Right to Court Decree of Dissolution. The Members agree that

irreparabte damage would be done to the goodwill and reputation of the Company if any
Member should bring an action in court to dissolve the Company. Care has been taken
in this Company Agreement to provide what the Members feel are fair and just payments
to be made to a Member whose relation with the Company is terminated for any reason.
Accordingly, each of the parties accepts the provision under this Company Agreement as
his sole entitlement on termination of his Company relation. Each party hereby waives
and renounces his right to seek a court decree of dissolution or to seek the appointment
by a court of a liquidator for the Company.
19.

Arbitration.

Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this

Agreement, or the breach thereof, shail be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon any award may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
20.

Trade Secrets. No Member shall, during the continuance of the Company

or for two years after said Member shall retire from the Company or the Member is
terminated by any means, divulge to any person not a member of the Company any trade
14

secrets or special information employed in or conducive to the Company business and,
which may come to his knowledge in the course of the Company, without the consent in
writing of the other Members, or of the other Partners' heirs, administrators or assigns.
It shall not be considered a breach of this condition if any trade secret is communicated
by the Company to United Title Services.
21.

Non-Competition, Upon retirement of a Member or on or after the expiration

of the term of this Agreement, or the termination of the Company, except if it is
terminated by reason of violation by, or defeat or death of, one Member, Members shall
not at any time, either alone, jointly or as agent for any person, directly or indirectly, set
up, exercise or carry on the same trade or business for a period of three years within
Washington County, State of Utah, and shall not set up, make or encourage any
opposition to the trade or business hereafter to be carried on by the other Members or
their representatives or assigns, nor do anything to the prejudice thereof. For violation
of this stipulation, the party at fault shall pay actual damages suffered by the Company
with a minimum amount of damages to be set at $250,000, which sum is the Partners'
good faith estimate of the minimum amount of damages which would be suffered by the
Company for such violation. It shall not be considered a violation of this provision if any
Member shall carry on business of any kind with United Title Services.
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22.

Miscellaneous provisions.
A.

Waiver Provisions. The failure of any party to seek redress for

violation of or to insist upon the strict performance of any covenant or condition of
this Agreement shall not prevent a subsequent act, which would have originally
constituted a violation, or have the effect of an original violation.
B.

Headings,

The headings in this Agreement are inserted for

convenience and Identification only and are in no way intended to describe,
interpret, define or limit the
scope, extent or intent of this Agreement or any provision hereof.
C.
severable.

Severability-

Every provision of this Agreement is intended to be

If any term or provision hereof Is illegal or invalid for any reason

whatsoever, such illegality or invalidity shall not affect the validity of the remainder
hereof.
D.

Liability of Members. The doing of any act or the failure to do any

act by a Member or the Company, the effect of which may cause or result in loss
or damage to the Company, if done pursuant to advice of legal counsel employed
by the Company, or If done in good faith to promote the best interests of the
Company, shall not subject such Member to any liability.
E.

Interpretations. This Agreement, and the application or interpretation

thereof, shall be governed exclusively by its terms and by the laws of the State of
16

Utah, other than its choice of law rules.
F.

Rights. The rights and remedies provided by this Agreement are

cumulative and the use of any onerightor remedy by a party shall not prelude or
waive its right to use any or all other remedies. Said rights and remedies are
given in addition to any other rights the parties may have by law, statutes,
ordinance or otherwise.
G.

Company

Opportunities.

Each and

every

Member

may,

notwithstanding the existence of this Agreement, severally engage in such noncompeting activities they choose without having or incurring any obligation to offer
any interest in such activities to any party hereto, except that Members may not
use the name of the Company in such activities without the unanimous consent
of the Members.
H-

Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of

counterparts with the same effect as if ail parties hereto had signed the same
document. All counterparts shall be construed together and shall constitute one
agreement.
I.

Provisions Binding Upon Successors. Each and all of the covenants,

terms, provisions and agreements herein contained shall be binding upon an inure
to the benefit of the parties hereto and, to the extent permitted by this Agreement,
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their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors
and assigns.
J.

Personal Property. The interests of each and every Members in the

Company shall be personal property.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Members have signed this Organization
Agreement the day and year first written above.

CRAIGCNEWMAN

DOUG STAtfjU

CHRIS MIULBAP
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ADDENDUM C

AMENDMENT TO OPERATING AGREEMENT
OF CCD, L.C.'S MEMBERS
This Amendment to the Operating Agreement of CCD, L.C. is entered into this l\ day of
April, 2000, by and among Craig Newman ("Newman"), Doug Stanley ("Stanley") and Chris
Millsap ("Millsap") (the foregoing are hereafter sometimes collectively referred to as the "Parties").
RECITALS
1.
On or about October 1, 1994, the Parties entered into an Operating Agreement
("Operating Agreement") forming CDC, L.C, now known as CCD, L.C. ("CCD"). On that same
date, the Parties executed the Articles of Organization of CDC, L.C, ("Articles of Organization").
The Articles of Organization were amended on September 16,1998, to change the name from CDC,
L.C to CCD, L.C
2.
On or about March 6,2000, the Chris and Sandra Millsap Family Trust and Millsap
gave a note in favor of CCD ("CCD Note") in the amount of Six Hundred Fifty-five Thousand Nine
Hundred Sixty-five and 04/100 Dollars ($655,965.04), which was secured by a deed of trust ("CCD
Trust Deed") that encumbers real property located in Washington County, Utah known as the
Pheasant Meadow Subdivision ("Property").
3.
Chris Millsap has given a note ("Miller Note") in favor of the D. J. Miller Family
Trust ("Miller Trust") that is secured by a deed of trust that encumbers the Property, which was
recorded with the Washington County Recorder's Office at Entry 00612228 in Book 1241 at Pages
0295-0296.
4.
The Parties desire that Newman lend money to the Chris and Sandra Millsap Family
Trust and Millsap ("Newman Loan") for the purpose of paying off the CCD Note. The Newman
Loan will be secured by all of the Property and by Millsap's ownership interest in CCD. The
purpose of the Newman Loan is to provide liquidity to CCD.

AGREEMENT
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants herein set forth
and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt, adequacy and legal sufficiency of which
are hereby acknowledged, the Parties mutually agree as follows:
A.
Pursuant to paragraph 7(E) of the Operating Agreement, the Parties, and each of
them, hereby agree and consent to Millsap granting to Newman a security interest in all of Millsap's
membership interest in CCD to secure, in part, the Newman Loan. From and after an event of
default under any of the documents evidencing the Newman Loan, any and all of Millsap's rights
to vote his membership interest in CCD shall be terminated and shall be immediately vested in

Newman, who shall be entitled to exercise all such rights from and after the date of the default.
Application of paragraph 12(C)(i) to any foreclosure of Millsap's ownership interest is hereby
waived. The Parties agree that if Newman forecloses against Millsap's ownership interest in CCD,
the purchaser of Millsap's ownership interest in CCD shall have one-third of the: (i) ownership
interest in CCD; (ii) voting rights to make decisions for CCD; (iii) CCD's profits and losses;
(iv) Millsap's CCD capital account; and (v) all other rights, benefits and obligations under the
Operating Agreement. The parties acknowledge, therefore, that if Newman foreclosed his security
interest against Millsap's ownership interest to CCD, Newman would have two-thirds of the voting
rights of CCD. No certificates evidencing ownership in CCD shall be issued while any amount is
owed under the Newman Loan. Millsap shall have no authority to withdraw funds from CCD's
general or escrow accounts. Paragraph 7(D) is amended to require two signatures on checks drawn
upon the escrow account, one of which must be by member of CCD and the other a CCD employee
designated by a majority of CCD's members. The Parties hereby agree to the admission as a
member of CCD any person or entity purchasing Millsap's interest in CCD through a foreclosure
of Newman's security interest therein, and waive the application of paragraph 11 of the Operating
Agreement to any such sale. The Parties hereby waive the applicability of Paragraph 12(C)(ii) to
any sale of Millsap's ownership interest in CCD pursuant to a foreclosure proceeding brought by
Newman or his successors-in-interest to foreclose the security interest granted to Newman by
Millsap.
B.
1 f Millsap dies, retires or his employment with CCD is terminated and his interest is
not purchased by CCD or any of its remaining members as provided under paragraph 12(B) of the
Operating Agreement, CCD's business shall continue and shall not be dissolved or wound up.
Specifically, the Parties waive the application of the following provisions contained in the Operating
Agreement to Millsap's death, retirement or the termination of his employment with CCD: (i) the
following portion of paragraph 12(B): "If neither the Company nor the remaining Members elect
to purchase the Company interest of the retiring or deceased Member in accordance with this
Paragraph, the Company shall be wound up and all its properties distributed in liquidation pursuant
to Section 16 hereof1; and (ii) the following portion of paragraph 16(A) which would constitute an
event of dissolution: "Upon the death or retirement of a Member, unless the Company is continued
by the purchase of such Partner's interest and in accordance with the provisions of Section 12(B)."
The Parties agree that notwithstanding (i) Millsap's retirement from CCD; (ii) the death of Millsap;
(iii) the termination of his employment with CCD; or (iv) the termination of his ownership interest
in CCD, that CCD shall continue to operate and any such events shall not constitute or effect a
dissolution of CCD. The Parties agree that Paragraph 16(D) shall have no force or effect as to any
ownership interest Newman or his successors-in-interest have in CCD and hereby waive all rights
to enforce that provision as to any ownership interest held by Newman or his successors-in-interest.
C.
The Parties agree that Millsap is hereby removed as a manager of CCD and that
Newman and Stanley shall be managers. Paragraph 7(C) is amended as follows: The duties and
responsibilities of the Members shall include, but not be limited to the following:
(i)

CCD\MEMBERS-AGMT-2.\vp<J(hjg)

Chris Millsap is responsible for generating business;
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(ii)

(iii)

Doug Stanley is responsible for training personnel, title work, underwriting,
managing the St. George office, including handling escrow personnel and
financial matters; and
Craig Newman is responsible for training escrow personnel and financial
matters.

Paragraph 13 of the Operating Agreement shall not apply to removal of Millsap as a member of CCD
or to his retirement or the termination of his employment with CCD, and the Parties hereby waive
any claims for the breach of that provision with respect to the removal of Millsap as a member of
CCD, his retirement, death, or the termination of his employment with CCD. The Parties agree that
if no default has occurred under the Newman Loan, the Newman Loan has been paid in full and
within one year after the Newman Loan has been paid in full the Parties have not amended the
Operating Agreement, then the modifications contained in paragraphs B and C herein shall thereafter
be of no further force and effect and the terms of the Operating Agreement shall thereafter be binding
upon the Parties.
D.
The Parties hereby consent to the Newman Loan and acknowledge and agree that
(i) the outstanding amount of the CCD Note is $493,965.04; (ii) payment of that amount constitutes
payment in full of the CCD Note; and (iii) upon payment to CCD of that amount from the proceeds
from the Newman Loan, the Parties consent to CCD sending to the beneficiary of the CCD Trust
Deed, United Title Services, Inc. ("Beneficiary"), a Request for Full Reconveyance in the form
attached hereto as Exhibit A, requesting that the Beneficiary execute and record with the Washington
County recorder's office a Deed of Reconveyance in the form attached as Exhibit B.
E.
By entering into this Agreement, Newman, Stanley and CCD do not waive any claims
they may have against Millsap, including any claims under the Operating Agreement, at law or in
equity. Millsap hereby acknowledges and agrees that Newman, Stanley and CCD have and are
reserving any and all such claims.
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EXECUTED the day and year first above written.

Craig Newman

Doug Stanre

ins Millsap
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ADDENDUM D

Stephen E.W. Hale (A5285)
Justin P. Matkin (8847)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750

BY.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CCD, L.C., a Utah limited liability company
d/b/a UNITED TITLE SERVICES OF
SOUTHERN UTAH,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 010^501860

vs.
CHRISTOPHER LYNN MILLSAP, an
individual, and THE CHRIS AND SANDRA
MILLSAP FAMILY TRUST,

Judge James L. Shumate
Defendants.

Defendant Christopher Lynn Millsap's ("Millsap") Motion for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiff CCD, L.C.'s ("CCD") Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the
Honorable James L. Shumate on June 6, 2002. James C. Bradshaw appeared on behalf of
Mr. Millsap, and Stephen E. W. Hale appeared on behalf of CCD.
The Court, having received and reviewed the Motions for Summary Judgment of Mr. Millsap
and CCD and the memoranda in support thereof, and the affidavits of Mr. Christopher Millsap,
Mr. Craig Newman, and Mr. Doug Stanley, having considered oral arguments of counsel and having
entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby

Enters Judgment in favor of CCD, L.C., and Christopher Lynn Millsap is hereby expelled as
a member of CCD; and
FURTHER ORDERS, DECREES AND ADJUDGES that Mr. Millsap is not entitled to
participate in the management and affairs of CCD or to vote or be a member or to exercise any rights
of a member or a manager under the Operating Agreement or the Amendment.
DATED this J

day of J4w$2002.
BY THE COURT

JAMES~L. SHUMATE
Fifth District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (#hay of June, 2002, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Granting CCD, L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed, first-class postage prepaid
thereon, addressed to
James C. Bradshaw, Esq.
Brown Bradshaw & Moffat
10 West Broadway, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

f7t;< Li f) jfahrtiuA
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Stephen E. W. Hale (A5285)
Justin P. Matkin (8847)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750

BY.

|v

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CCD, L.C., a Utah limited liability company
d/b/a UNITED TITLE SERVICES OF
SOUTHERN UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 010*501860

CHRISTOPHER LYNN MILLSAP, an
individual, and THE CHRIS AND SANDRA
MILLSAP FAMILY TRUST,

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendants.

Defendant Christopher Lynn Millsap's ("Millsap") Motion for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiff CCD, L.C.'s ("CCD") Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the
Honorable James L. Shumate on June 6, 2002. James C. Bradshaw appeared on behalf of
Mr. Millsap, and Stephen E. W. Hale appeared on behalf of CCD.
The Court, having received and reviewed the Motions for Summary Judgment of Mr. Millsap
and CCD and the memoranda in support thereof, and the affidavits of Mr. Christopher Millsap,
Mr. Craig Newman ("Newman"), and Mr. Doug Stanley ("Stanley"), and having considered oral
arguments of counsel, the Court hereby makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT FOR WHICH THERE ARE
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT:
1.

On October 1,1994, Messrs. Newman, Stanley and Millsap entered into an Operating

Agreement whereby CDC, L.C., now known as CCD, was formed. Paragraph E of the Operating
Agreement provides "no Member, without the majority consent of the Members, shall: . . .
(vii) use . . . the property of the Company for any purpose other than a proper Company purpose;
(viii) do any act detrimental to the Company business or which would make it impossible to carry
on the business
2.

"

CCD is engaged in the title insurance business and in connection therewith opened

a trust account with Zions First National Bank, N.A. ("Trust Account").
3.

From at least March 1999 to February 2000, Mr. Millsap withdrew funds from the

Trust Account that he was not authorized to use. The amount Mr. Millsap wrongfully took from the
Trust Account exceeded $625,004.05. He used those funds for his personal benefit in connection
with development of his residential real estate development located in Washington County known
as the Pheasant Meadow Subdivision.
4.

After Messrs. Newman and Stanley discovered Mr. Millsap's wrongful use of the

Trust Account monies, they entered into an agreement with Mr. Millsap on April 21,2000, entitled
"Amendment to Operating Agreement of the CCD, L.C.'s Members" ("Amendment"). Pursuant to
the Amendment, Mr. Millsap agreed that he would "have no authority to withdraw funds from
CCD's general or escrow accounts." In connection with the execution of the Amendment,
Mr. Newman lent Mr. Millsap $493,965.04 pursuant to the promissory note dated April 21, 2000,
the proceeds of which were used to eliminate the amount of the deficit Mr. Millsap reported to
Messrs. Newman and Stanley.
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5.

After the Amendment was signed, Mr. Millsap endorsed checks drawn upon the Trust

Account. Mr. Millsap's withdrawal of funds from the Trust Account constitutes a breach of the
Amendment.
6.

On September 28,2001, CCD filed this lawsuit against Mr. Millsap seeking, among

other relief, expulsion of Mr. Millsap as a member of CCD.
7.

On October 16, 2001, Mr. Millsap notified Messrs. Newman and Stanley that

Mr. Millsap was purportedly retiring from his membership of CCD.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Millsap moved the Court for summary judgment claiming that, because he tendered
notice of his retirement on October 16,2001, he was no longer a member of CCD by operation of
UTAH CODE ANN. § §

48-2c-709 and 708(c). He claimed that UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-710, which

provides for expulsion of a member, did not apply to him because his withdrawal terminated his
membership and that section of the Code only applies to expulsion of an existing member of a
limited liability company.
CCD also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to expel Mr. Millsap as a member.
As grounds for expulsion, CCD relied upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-710. Specifically, CCD
relied upon subsections (3)(a) and (b) of § 48-2c-710 as bases for expulsion, which provide as
grounds for expulsion under circumstances where a member "(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct
that adversely and materially affected the Company's business; (b) has willfully or persistently
committed a material breach of the . . . operating agreement . . . ." CCD claims that because
Mr. Millsap materially breached the Operating Agreement and Amendment, he was not entitled to
enforce the provisions of the Operating Agreement, including the right to retire. He, therefore,
continues as a member of the CCD and has no right to retire. Moreover, CCD claims that
Messrs. Newman and Stanley were fraudulently induced to enter into the Amendment, and,
3

therefore, it is void. CCD argues that Mr. Millsap's conduct constitutes material breaches of the
Operating Agreement and Amendment, and materially and adversely affected the operations of CCD.
Consequently, CCD claims that Mr. Millsap should be expelled. Finally, CCD has asserted that even
if Mr. Millsap were entitled to retire under the Operating Agreement, Section 48-2c-710 allows for
his expulsion.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

Mr. Millsap materially breached the Operating Agreement and the Amendment, and

based upon thefirstto breach rule of law, he is not entitled to enforce any of the terms of either the
Operating Agreement or the Amendment.
2.

Mr. Millsap's conduct was wrongful and it adversely and materially affected CCD's

business.
3.

The intent of the Utah State Legislature when it enacted UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 48-2c-710 was to enable a company, such as CCD, to expel members, such as Mr. Millsap, from
membership in the limited liability company where the wrongful acts occurred and the Complaint
wasfiledbefore the member withdrew from membership in the limited liability company.
4.

Mr. Millsap should be expelled as a member of CCD pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 48-2c-708(l)(e) and 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (b).
5.

There are genuine issues of material fact about whether Messrs. Newman and Stanley

were fraudulently induced to enter into the Amendment.
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Millsap's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and
CCD's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
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BY THE COURT

lAMES L. SHUMATE
""Fifth District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the jQ_ aay of June, 2002, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Granting CCD, L.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed, first-class postage prepaid
thereon, addressed to
James C. Bradshaw, Esq.
Brown Bradshaw & Moffat
10 West Broadway, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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